Section: Geopolitics
Format: Special Report
Author: Sinisa Brkic (sb)
US-Iran War: How the Strait of Hormuz Crisis Is Reshaping Global Power. The US-Iran war has turned the Strait of Hormuz into the center of a global energy, security and geopolitical crisis.
The confrontation between the United States and Iran has turned the Strait of Hormuz into the most dangerous pressure point in the global economy. Military strikes, attacks on commercial shipping and the disruption of energy exports have transformed a regional war into a test of international power, economic resilience and political credibility. Diplomatic contacts have resumed, but neither Washington nor Tehran has yet produced a viable path out of the conflict.
The World’s Most Critical Chokepoint Has Become a Battlefield
The Strait of Hormuz is not simply another contested waterway. It is the narrow maritime passage through which roughly one fifth of global petroleum consumption and about 20 percent of worldwide liquefied natural gas trade normally move. Few alternative routes have enough capacity to replace it, which gives every military incident in the area an immediate international impact.
Since the conflict escalated, shipping through the strait has been severely restricted. Tankers have delayed voyages, insurers have raised risk premiums and crews have faced the possibility of missile, drone or naval attacks while performing what would ordinarily be commercial operations. A confrontation between two states has therefore become a direct threat to companies, consumers and governments far beyond the Middle East.
This is the central strategic reality of the crisis. Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily to impose significant costs on Washington and its partners. It only needs to keep the world uncertain about whether energy and commercial traffic can move safely through Hormuz.
Washington Has Firepower but No Clear Political End State
The United States possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority. Its forces can strike Iranian air defenses, missile facilities, naval infrastructure and command centers with a level of reach that Tehran cannot match. Military dominance, however, does not automatically produce political control.
The deeper problem is that Washington’s objectives remain difficult to reconcile. The administration wants to weaken Iran’s military capabilities, protect US forces, restore freedom of navigation and compel Tehran to accept new security arrangements. At the same time, it wants to prevent a prolonged war, contain energy prices and avoid destabilizing allied Gulf governments.
Those goals do not form a coherent exit strategy on their own. Every additional strike may reduce part of Iran’s military capacity, but it can also increase Tehran’s incentive to target shipping, regional infrastructure or American bases. The United States can escalate more effectively than Iran, yet escalation alone cannot guarantee a settlement.
President Donald Trump’s decision to halt planned strikes on July 24 offered the clearest recent indication that Washington may be searching for diplomatic space. His statement that talks are taking place suggests that communication channels remain open, but his acknowledgment that Iran is not ready for an agreement underlines how far the parties remain from a durable arrangement.
Iran Is Turning Vulnerability Into Leverage
Iran cannot compete with the United States aircraft for aircraft or missile for missile. Its strategy instead relies on geography, uncertainty and the ability to threaten several theaters at once. The Strait of Hormuz is central to that approach because it allows Tehran to convert military pressure on Iranian territory into economic pressure on the wider world.
Attacks on ships and threats against regional bases force Washington to defend a broad and vulnerable network. American forces are distributed across Gulf states whose energy facilities, ports, airports and desalination plants are exposed to missiles and drones. The result is a conflict in which even limited Iranian retaliation can generate consequences far beyond the physical damage caused.
Tehran’s strategy is dangerous, but it is not irrational. Iranian leaders appear to believe that the global economic cost of an extended disruption will eventually exceed Washington’s tolerance for continued war. Their leverage depends less on battlefield success than on making normal commercial activity too risky, too expensive or politically unsustainable.
That calculation also carries profound risks for Iran. Sustained attacks on international shipping could deepen the country’s diplomatic isolation, provoke broader military action and alienate states that might otherwise resist Washington’s policy. Leverage can quickly become liability when coercion begins to look like indiscriminate economic warfare.
The Gulf States Are Caught Inside the Conflict
The wealthy Gulf monarchies have spent years presenting themselves as centers of trade, investment and controlled modernization. The war has exposed the strategic weakness beneath that model. Their economies depend on open sea routes, secure infrastructure and a regional order ultimately protected by foreign military power.
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have different relationships with Iran, but none can remain detached from a conflict involving US forces stationed on or near their territory. Iranian retaliation against American facilities can place surrounding civilian and economic infrastructure at risk even when those governments have no interest in expanding the war.
This creates an uncomfortable political dilemma. Gulf leaders rely on the United States for security, yet the American military presence can also make their countries targets. Their public calls for de-escalation reflect more than diplomatic caution; they reveal an urgent need to prevent the regional security architecture from becoming the mechanism through which the war spreads.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have developed alternative export routes that reduce some dependence on Hormuz. Those systems provide resilience, but they cannot fully compensate for the loss of the strait’s normal capacity. Qatar, whose liquefied natural gas exports rely heavily on Hormuz, faces an even narrower set of options.
The Energy Shock Is Already Reordering Economic Priorities
The closure and repeated disruption of Hormuz have removed large volumes of oil, refined products and liquefied natural gas from their usual routes. Producers have redirected what they can through pipelines and ports outside the Persian Gulf, but spare transport capacity remains limited. Global markets have absorbed the first shock better than many feared, although the buffers protecting them are steadily weakening.
For energy importing economies, higher oil and gas costs operate like a tax on households and businesses. Transportation, manufacturing, agriculture and electricity generation all become more expensive, while governments face pressure to subsidize fuel or soften the impact on consumers. Central banks must then judge whether the resulting inflation is temporary or likely to become embedded.
Europe is particularly exposed because it is still managing the strategic consequences of earlier energy disruptions. A sustained reduction in Gulf supplies would intensify competition for liquefied natural gas and place renewed pressure on industrial costs. Asian economies dependent on imported fuel face similar difficulties, especially when weaker currencies amplify the price increase.
The International Monetary Fund now expects global growth of 3.0 percent in 2026, with the Middle East and Central Asia suffering a far sharper slowdown. The broader world economy has not collapsed under the pressure, but resilience should not be confused with immunity. The longer Hormuz remains unstable, the more likely temporary market adjustments are to become structural economic damage.
Commercial Shipping Has Become a Weapon of State Pressure
The attacks on merchant vessels represent more than collateral disruption. They show how commercial infrastructure can be used as a pressure point in modern conflict. Ships, crews, insurers and port operators are being forced to absorb risks created by military decisions over which they have no control.
The International Maritime Organization has repeatedly condemned attacks on commercial vessels and warned about the danger to seafarers. Tens of thousands of crew members have faced delays or entrapment across the region, while shipping companies must decide whether contractual obligations justify entering a zone where safe passage cannot be guaranteed.
The consequences extend throughout global supply chains. When ships avoid a region, wait for escorts or demand higher freight rates, the costs spread into commodity prices, delivery schedules and industrial planning. Maritime insecurity therefore becomes an economic instrument even when the physical number of damaged vessels remains limited.
The crisis also tests the credibility of freedom of navigation as an international principle. If a state can impose control over a major waterway through threats and selective attacks, other powers may study the precedent. Hormuz is therefore not only an energy route; it is a test of whether global commerce still operates under enforceable rules or under the permission of the strongest local actor.
Diplomacy Is Active but Trust Has Collapsed
Oman remains one of the few actors capable of carrying messages between Washington and Tehran. Its diplomatic role is indispensable because direct political trust between the two capitals has effectively disappeared. Other regional states may support negotiations, but few possess Oman’s history of discreet mediation and access to both sides.
The immediate diplomatic task is relatively clear. Iran would need to guarantee safe passage through Hormuz, while the United States would need to limit or suspend military operations and provide a credible route toward broader negotiations. The difficulty lies in enforcement, sequencing and the fear that any concession will simply allow the other side to regroup.
A ceasefire without verification would be fragile. A maritime agreement without a wider political settlement would remain vulnerable to every missile launch, ship inspection or disputed military movement. The conflict has already demonstrated how quickly limited arrangements can collapse when neither side believes the other intends to honor the broader purpose of the agreement.
The latest pause in US strikes may create an opening, but it does not yet constitute de-escalation. Washington could resume operations at short notice, and Tehran retains the ability to pressure shipping or US allies. Diplomacy is therefore taking place under the immediate threat of renewed violence, not after the danger has passed.
China and Russia See Opportunity as Well as Risk
China has a direct economic interest in restoring stable energy flows from the Gulf. It is also reluctant to support a US-led security order that would strengthen Washington’s control over one of the world’s most important maritime routes. Beijing therefore wants stability, but not necessarily on American terms.
Russia benefits from higher energy prices and from any crisis that divides the United States from its allies. At the same time, uncontrolled escalation could damage global demand, disrupt Russian trade partners and create wider instability that Moscow cannot fully manage. Its position combines geopolitical opportunity with genuine economic risk.
Both powers are likely to resist diplomatic outcomes that exclude them from the regional balance. Their opposition to parts of the Western approach at the United Nations has already demonstrated the limits of collective action. The Security Council remains capable of expressing concern, but the major powers are too divided to impose a common political framework.
Europe has less military leverage but a substantial economic stake. Its governments support freedom of navigation and a negotiated settlement, yet they remain dependent on American security capabilities in the region. That imbalance leaves Europe exposed to the consequences of decisions it can influence only marginally.
The Crisis Is Also a Test of American Credibility
For Washington, the conflict is about more than Iran. Allies are watching whether the United States can protect international shipping without becoming trapped in another open-ended Middle Eastern war. Rivals are assessing whether American military superiority can still deliver predictable political results.
A prolonged confrontation would sharpen the contradiction at the heart of US strategy. America seeks to concentrate more attention and resources on competition with China, but repeated crises in the Middle East continue to demand forces, diplomacy and political capital. Every additional month of war weakens the argument that Washington can manage both theaters without strategic overextension.
Domestic pressure will also increase if fuel prices remain elevated or American casualties rise. Military action may command initial support when presented as retaliation or deterrence, but public tolerance narrows when objectives become unclear. The administration must therefore show not only that it can punish Iran, but that its actions are producing a safer and more stable outcome.
The same credibility test applies to Iran. Tehran has demonstrated that it can disrupt regional security, but disruption is not the same as strategic success. If the war leaves the country more damaged, more isolated and under tighter military pressure, its ability to impose costs will not compensate for the deterioration of its own position.
Hormuz Will Define the Next Stage of the War
The most immediate indicator of whether the crisis is easing will not be a political speech or another claim of military success. It will be the return of commercial shipping under conditions that insurers, crews and energy companies regard as genuinely safe. Without that, declarations of de-escalation will remain largely symbolic.
A durable settlement requires more than reopening the strait. It would need rules governing military activity, guarantees for shipping, limits on attacks against regional infrastructure and a negotiating channel able to survive future incidents. None of those elements is currently secure.
The alternative is a cycle of temporary pauses followed by renewed strikes. Such a pattern may allow both governments to avoid formal defeat, but it would keep the global economy exposed to political decisions made under pressure and with little margin for error. A single miscalculation could again close the diplomatic window within hours.
Hormuz has become the place where military power, energy dependence and global credibility collide. The United States can dominate the battlefield, and Iran can keep the economic costs high, but neither side can control the consequences alone. That is what makes this crisis so dangerous: the actors possess ample capacity to escalate, yet no reliable mechanism to contain what follows.
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